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SUMMARY 
Peculiar patterns have emerged in municipal politics in Canada. Unlike at federal 
and provincial levels of government, party politics is weak or absent in cities. But 
looking at the entire history of municipal elections of three Western Canadian 
cities — Calgary, Edmonton and Vancouver — also finds that, again unlike 
politicians at higher levels, municipal representatives are increasingly more likely 
to win repeated re-elections, facing a much lower threat from any competitive 
challenge. In addition, the careers of municipal politicians are growing steadily 
longer, leading to relatively stable, almost static, city governments that tend to 
see change most commonly when councillors choose to step down, rather than 
being forced out.
Such patterns, of course, run counter to the general presumption in lively 
democracies, including this one, that the responsiveness of government leaders 
(that is, following the wishes of their constituents) and their accountability for 
the actions they take are best served by frequent turnovers in government: The 
need to throw politicians out every now and again to let new ones try and do 
things better. Whether the remarkable levels of stability and incumbency on city 
councils actually do serve the best interests of voters is unclear. More clear is 
that the lack of a party system at the city level seems to have contributed to this 
peculiar dynamic, and that city politicians have an interest in keeping it that way.
While party affiliations provide a candidate some benefits in the form of 
campaign co-ordination, they also provide voters with increased clarity about 
what each candidate stands for policy-wise. That might be helpful to voters, but 
city politicians might find it more useful to blur their positions, leaving voters 
uncertain of exactly how to define a specific councillor’s stand, overall. The 
amount of information required to root through a councillor’s voting record, and the 
relatively light media coverage of daily council business, leaves most voters inclined to 
rely on something other than political signals when they decide who to support. Inevitably, 
a candidate’s personal character and length of experience take on a larger priority in the 
voting decision. So, the longer a councillor serves, the longer he or she might be likely to 
keep serving.
The natural outcome of this phenomenon is that city councils are less likely to become 
polarized as councillors have an incentive to seek consensus by limiting obvious policy 
distinctions between themselves and their fellow representatives, contributing to a 
dynamic where city council works more like a corporate body and less like a partisan 
legislature. As long as citizens remain largely unperturbed by the overall actions of their 
city council, they might judge the risk of replacing them at election time as unnecessarily 
high compared to sticking with the status quo.
This behaviour challenges much of the prevailing theory about how political processes 
improve political responsiveness and accountability. This is occurring at a time when 
cities are emerging as important and increasingly powerful nodes in the modern global 
economy. That the very nature of how they are governed is diverging so markedly from 
the norm that Canadians have come to expect from other levels of government is not 
something to be considered lightly.
1INTRODUCTION 
Responsiveness and accountability are central to our understanding of the policy process 
in representative democracies. Governments are responsive to the preferences of voters, 
who in turn hold governments to account for their policies and actions. Elections are the 
central means for achieving these ends. By studying elections in Calgary, Edmonton and 
Vancouver, we seek to understand how these mechanisms operate in the city politics that 
increasingly shape the policy environment experienced by most Canadians. 
Elections are an opportunity for voters to cast a ballot that reflects their policy preferences 
as well as an assessment of the past performance of governments and politicians. A 
voter selects the choice that best matches his or her prospective policy preferences and a 
retrospective assessment of whether his or her situation has improved or worsened over 
the time the government has been in office. This provides incentives for politicians to take 
account of the wishes of voters and in general behave well, and for voters to build policy 
preferences and remain informed as to the actions of elected officials. 
We are particularly interested in whether the signalling required to sustain these relationships 
is present at municipal elections, which regularly exhibit low levels of competition and 
provide voters with limited information on the position of candidates and the actions of 
council. That is, do the peculiar circumstances of municipal elections alter the behaviour of 
voters and politicians compared to that found in federal and provincial elections?
Our unique dataset allows us to consider such questions via the careers of 910 councillors 
and mayors in three Canadian cities, Calgary, Edmonton and Vancouver, across all 
elections since their incorporation. That is, since 1885, 1892 and 1886 respectively. Linking 
these data to the Canadian Elections Database allows us to identify those who also had 
careers at the provincial and national levels.1 With this information, we analyze various 
features of the political careers of municipal politicians for insight into the nature of 
responsiveness and accountability in city politics and beyond. 
We operationalize responsiveness and accountability as clarity of choice and concentration 
of responsibility respectively.2 We consider how career duration, rates of incumbency, 
turnover in council membership, and the trajectory of municipal political careers shape 
voters’ ability to correctly identify the candidate who best reflects her or his policy 
preference and to identify those responsible for past policy decisions that have shaped 
voters’ circumstances.3 Each of these features has implications for the burden on voters 
seeking to understand the policy positions of candidates for election — clarity of choice 
— and the decisions made by past councils — concentration of responsibility — in what is 
usually a low-information environment.
We find that long career duration, low turnover, high rates of incumbency, and 
political trajectories beyond city council enhance clarity of choice and concentration 
1 
Anthony M. Sayers, Canadian Elections Database, http://canadianelectionsdatabase.ca/PHASE4/, accessed February 7, 2017.
2 Russell J. Dalton and Christopher Anderson, Citizens, Context, and Choice: How Context Shapes Citizens’ Electoral 
Choices (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
3 Accountability has been operationalized in many ways in the political-science and public-policy literatures to capture 
different aspects of answerability, including those with little direct connection to elections (such as input and output 
legitimacy in the policy process). Our focus in this paper is on politicians and political careers, and thus on political 
accountability and elections. 
2of responsibility by increasing the likelihood that voters know the policy positions of 
candidates and the past decisions of councillors. That is, all things being equal, stability 
enhances voter knowledge of the policy positions of some of those seeking election and 
the actions of past councils. Given that stability may also shape levels of voter engagement 
in elections, a full understanding of these effects is not possible given the data that are 
currently available for our three cases.
Stability as a representational advantage runs counter to the presumption that regular 
turnover in a legislative body is prima facie evidence of responsiveness and accountability. 
To explore this further, we consider the sources of inertia in civic politics and the lack or at 
least underdevelopment of political parties in our case studies.
In a low information environment, incumbents have a great deal of freedom to shape public 
perceptions of their policy preferences and record on council with an eye to gaining re-
election. This may well limit the appeal of partisan politics. Incumbents may well judge 
the electoral and legislative coordination advantages that come with the development of 
disciplined political parties as outweighed by the added transparency and limitations on 
their strategic behaviour that these imply.
In addition, without a dominant executive, councils lack the centralizing dynamics that help 
to sustain disciplined political parties.4 Limited or no partisan competition in turn denies 
the media access to the gladiatorial forms of political reporting that has helped strengthen 
the role of parties elsewhere. 
Politicians face incentives to operate as a collective with their fellow councillors, 
minimizing predictable differences on policy and avoiding scandal that might lead 
moderately informed voters to defeat them as a group. This suggests that those wishing to 
influence councils should fashion strategies that are consistent with councillors’ sense of 
corporate unity and the lack of executive control of the legislative agenda.
As for voters, with little evidence that stability leads to regular crises on council, and 
only a general impression of the policy positions of incumbents, it may be rational for 
them to either re-endorse city politicians based on experience, or to not vote at all. This is 
particularly so if it is not in the interests of councillors to highlight policy differences nor 
poor performance by other council members 
Responsiveness and accountability appear to operate in unique ways at city elections. 
Limited competition in a low information environment alters the behaviour of politicians 
and voters from that found at other elections. The paucity of research on civic politics does 
not allow us to fully explore these ideas, but they are deserving of closer attention. 
CITIES
Cities are increasingly important in the lives of people and the global economy. In 1950, 30 
per cent of the global human population lived in cities and 70 per cent in the countryside; 
by 2050 these numbers will be reversed, with 70 per cent of people living in cities and a 
minority in the countryside. Cities encompass a growing share of the global economy as 
4 
Gary W. Cox, The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1987). 
3service and knowledge industries join traditional manufacturing to contribute to their role 
as attractors of the highly educated, entrepreneurial, high-net-worth individuals who drive 
economic growth.5
While modern cities are not usually sovereign, limitations on the power of nation states 
combined with the vitality of cities is reshaping the relationship between the two. The 
growing importance of cities in national and international economic and political affairs 
and their role as service delivery mechanisms suggest the binary distinction — state versus 
non-state city — may be of less value in describing how political and economic power 
operate in a globalized world.6 They are critical nodes in the international economy and 
central to successfully dealing with the modern challenges and opportunities relating to 
transportation, technology, energy, and the environment.
Currently, the city of London is exploring special arrangements with respect to immigration 
and workforce management as a means of avoiding challenges to its prosperity that might 
flow from Britain exiting the European Union.7 Among the powers that the mayors of 
Edmonton and Calgary have floated for possible inclusion in a proposed city charter are 
administrative tribunals to deal with bylaw offences, greater local control of planning for 
publicly financed infrastructure such as schools, and new taxing powers.8 
Canadian cities collectively raise, spend, and borrow billions of dollars, provide extensive 
goods and services to the public, and oversee major infrastructure investments.9 They 
regularly bid for or host major international events, such as the Olympics, that bind 
provincial and federal governments to massive outlays. They also play a key role in 
provincial and national politics and in the formation of central decision-making institutions 
such as federal and provincial cabinets.10 To understand the politics and policy-making of 
cities is to understand the politics and policy-making of the future. 
CLARITY OF CHOICE AND CONCENTRATION OF RESPONSIBILITY
To be fully engaged, democratic responsiveness and accountability require clarity of choice 
and concentration of responsibility. Elections must offer clear and comprehensible choices 
among parties, leaders and candidates if voters are to signal their policy preferences to 
governments effectively. For governments to be retrospectively punished or rewarded for 
5 See, for example, Joseph Parilla and Alan Berube, “Metro North America: Cities and the Metros as Hubs of Advanced 
Industries and Integrated Goods Trade” (Brookings Institution, 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2013/11/bmpp_MetroNA_FINAL.pdf. 
6 Warren Magnusson, The Politics of Urbanism: Seeing Like a City (London: Routledge, 2011). 
7 
Marc Champion, “What will become of London after Brexit?” Bloomberg, October 21, 2016. 
8 
Nenshi, Naheed. 2016. ‘Nenshi: A City Charter is Going to Make Calgary a Better Community,’ Oct 7, Calgary Herald. 
http://calgaryherald.com/opinion/columnists/nenshi-a-city-charter-is-going-to-make-calgary-a-better-community accessed 
October 13, 2016. 
9 
Bill Curry, “Canada’s Governments Brace for Looming Debt Crunch,” The Globe and Mail, May 12, 2015; and Kyle 
Hanniman, “Why Municipal Borrowing is No Crisis in Waiting,” The Globe and Mail, November 12, 2016. 
10 
Anthony Sayers, “City Ministers: The Local Politics of Cabinet Selection,” in Parties, Elections, and the Future of 
Canadian Politics, ed. Amanda Bittner and Royce Koop (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013); Royce Koop and Amanda Bittner, 
“Parachuted into Parliament: Candidate Nomination, Appointed Candidates, and Legislative Roles in Canada,” Journal 
of Elections, Public Opinion, and Parties 21, 4 (2011): 431-452; Alan Walks, “Suburbanization, the Vote, and Changes in 
Federal and Provincial Political Representation and Influence Between Inner Cities and Suburbs in Large Canadian Urban 
Regions, 1945-1999,” Urban Affairs Review 39, 4 (2004): 411-440. 
4their policy choices, institutions and processes should provide clear lines of authority and 
transparency of executive action. Clarity of choice and concentration of responsibility are 
the keys to effective democratic representation.11
Figure One models the signalling relationship between voters and governments in the 
context of the policy process. Voters’ preferences are transmitted to government, which 
in turn responds by generating appropriate policies. At a subsequent election, voters hold 
government to account by assessing the policy outcomes it has produced. While there are 
circumstances under which it is possible to construct this as a direct relationship — voters’ 
preferences on an issue are known to the government, which generates a clear policy 
response that voters directly assess — it is mostly parties and leaders that mediate the 
relationship via platforms and mandates. 







Signals Mandates Policies Outcomes
Adapted from Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski and Susan C. Stokes, “Elections and Representation,” in Democracy, 
Accountability, and Representation, ed. Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes and Bernard Manin (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999).
Parties and the party system along with the executive are crucial to this view of 
representative democracy. In competing for office, political parties offer voters suites of 
policies in the hope of attracting sufficient votes to form or be part of a government. Voters 
make their choice based on some combination of the candidate and the party platform that 
best captures their policy preferences.
This arrangement responds to the co-ordination incentives built into electoral systems 
and legislatures, and by linking candidates to widely advertised party policies it limits the 
information load voters are required to bear. The more clarity of choice offered to voters — 
clear and stable differences among the candidates for election — the greater the likelihood 
that their votes will reflect their preferences and that governments will be responsive to 
these signals.
11 Dalton and Anderson, Citizens, Table 1.4; Sara B. Hobolt, James Tilley, and Susan Banducci, “Clarity of Responsibility: 
How government cohesion conditions performance voting,” European Journal of Political Research 52, 2 (2013): 164-187. 
5Voters use similar cues to limit their informational task in holding governments to account. 
For example, they tend to treat government as a single-point actor, assigning 
responsibility for policies and choices as if an executive had full control of enactment and 
implementation.12 Using this as a guide, they punish or reward the candidates, parties and 
party leaders linked to the executive.13 The greater the concentration of responsibility 
evident to voters — clear decisions made by identifiable actors — the easier it is for voters 
to correctly punish or reward politicians for their policy choices.14
For their part, governments and politicians are inclined to encourage clear lines of 
accountability when they perceive it to be to their advantage, and obfuscate lines of 
accountability when they believe a policy choice might harm their electoral fortunes. This 
is possible because of the asymmetry between voters, who are information poor, and those 
they elect, who are not.15 
Some of the institutional elements associated with clarity of choice and concentration of 
responsibility, such as parties, party platforms and leaders, are missing in two of our cases 
and only modestly developed in the third. There are no or only limited party platforms or 
pronouncements by party leaders that might reduce the effort required of voters to identify 
where candidates stand or who was responsible for the major decisions of the previous 
council. The demands on voters wishing to understand policy decisions are great, even if 
there exist relatively stable voting coalitions. Voters may try to follow the voting behaviour 
of council members through the media, but this is extremely demanding. The lack of an 
executive that controls the political agenda removes a major driver of party formation and 
one of the links in the chain of accountability.
There is however increasing evidence of the role of candidates in shaping voter choice 
independent of party. In the extreme, voters may use their judgement as to the character of 
a politician as an algorithm that reduces the information effort required to make a voting 
choice. On the accountability side, politicians play a key role in making policy outcomes 
appear consistent with their previous statements and in framing deviations as required by 
exigent circumstance.16 Moreover, there is evidence that civic politicians make choices that 
are generally consistent with the apparent preferences of voters, although it is difficult to 
identify the mechanisms that link the two.17
12 
Christopher Wlezien and Stuart N. Soroka, “Federalism and Public Responsiveness to Policy,” Publius: The Journal of 
Federalism 41, 1 (2011): 31-52. 
13 
Sara B. Hobolt and James Tilley, Blaming Europe? Responsibility Without Accountability in the European Union (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014).
14 
Hobolt, Tilley and Banducci, “Clarity.” 
15 
Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski and Susan C. Stokes, “Elections and Representation,” in Democracy, Accountability, 
and Representation, ed. Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes and Bernard Manin (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 13; John Ferejohn, “Accountability and Authority: Toward a Theory of Political Accountability,” in Democracy, 
Accountability, and Representation ed. Adam Przeworksi, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 132.
16 
James D. Fearon, “Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor 
Performance,” in Democracy, Accountability, and Representation ed. Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard 
Manin (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
17 
Chris Tausanovitch and Christopher Warshaw, “Representation in Municipal Government,” American Political Science 
Review 108, 3 (2014): 605-641. 
6This approach generates a view of the role of candidates in shaping government 
responsiveness and accountability shown in Table One. Dimension one (vertical) 
distinguishes between situations of high and low levels of clarity of choice: the extent to 
which differences among candidates for election are clear and stable over time. Dimension 
two (horizontal) contrasts high and low levels of concentration of responsibility: the extent 
to which it is possible to correctly assign responsibility for policy outcomes to candidates.
TABLE ONE CLARITY OF CHOICE AND CONCENTRATION OF RESPONSIBILITY REGIMES
Concentration of Responsibility
High Low
Clarity of Choice High 1 2
Low 3 4
Table One provides us with four archetypal regimes and their associated representatives. 
We focus on these features at election time, consistent with our data. The top-right and 
bottom-left corners of the table (types 1 and 4) are the extremes: regimes in which clarity of 
choice and concentration of responsibility are highly correlated and both are either high or 
low, with the other two located between these extremes.
In Type 1 regimes, candidate policies are well known and incumbents are strongly 
associated with major policy decisions, perhaps down to the level where individual votes 
on major issues are widely known. Clarity of choice and concentration of responsibility are 
high.
A Type 2 regime operates in an environment where clarity of choice is high but 
concentration of responsibility is low. Election campaigns accentuate the policy positions of 
candidates but either due to perhaps turnover or a lack of information, it is difficult to link 
politicians to government decisions. It may also be that a lack of detailed information leads 
voters to evaluate the voting record of all councillors equally.
Regimes of Type 3 are characterized by low clarity of choice but high concentration of 
responsibility. Election campaigns do not focus on the differences between candidates, but 
do focus on the voting record of the entire council or, in an information-rich environment, 
individual councillors. 
Type 4 is associated with situations of low clarity of choice and low concentration of 
responsibility. Elections provide nearly no information as to the policy preferences of 
candidates or past decisions of council. We now move to consider how our data might help 
us to identify the presence of these regimes at elections in our three case studies.
MEASURING POLITICAL CAREERS
Our goal is to describe the large-scale, long-term factors that shape accountability and 
responsiveness in Canadian municipal politics using Calgary, Edmonton and Vancouver. 
We focus on the development of local political careers as a way of thinking about clarity 
of choice and concentration of responsibility in a low-information environment that places 
heavy demands on voters. To this end, we identify four features of civic political careers 
that might help us to understand the workings of representative democracy at the city level.
7The first is career duration. As Joseph Schlesinger famously noted, the short-term, 
amateur career — in which men and women briefly take up the noble yoke of office, like 
Cincinnatus, and then quietly return to private life — may work against responsiveness 
and accountability.18 We are unable to say anything about the conditions under which the 
councillors in our study were elected (perhaps for example, by pursuing distinctive policies) 
or whether they were altruistic and sought to represent the interest of their constituents. But 
it is reasonable to presume that longer careers allow for the possibility of clarity of choice 
and provide a record on which voters might make judgement in terms of responsibility. 
A second relevant consideration is incumbency. Among the key features of municipal 
politics in Canada, is the remarkable electoral power of incumbents: except in cases of 
scandal, those who are currently in office are likely to remain if they wish.19 While we 
might legitimately worry about responsiveness and accountability when incumbency rates 
remain high over extended periods of time, it is possible that they reflect nothing more than 
ongoing public satisfaction with politicians. 
Closely related to incumbency is the question of council turnover. While incumbency rates 
provide a picture of the likelihood that a politician will be defeated, turnover rates focus 
on council as a body: the proportion of “new faces” in the council chamber each year. Low 
turnover rates may improve council’s capacity to develop coherent and responsive policies 
over time and to signal policy positions and outcomes. On the other hand, change may 
indicate that voters are punishing incumbents for poor performance.
A final consideration is career trajectory. Since Schlesinger’s path-breaking work in the 
1960s, political scientists have recognized that responsiveness may vary in important ways 
depending on a politician’s career path. Those who harbour ambitions for higher office are 
likely to look for opportunities to distinguish themselves as innovative policy leaders.20 The 
formal division of authority of Canadian federalism provides opportunities for politicians to 
signal policy positions and demonstrate a willingness to take responsibility for their actions 
before running for office at another level.21 Our data on political careers allow us to provide 
an overview of career trajectories and career types over time as indicators of whether 
politicians make use of these opportunities. 
Because we lack a range of information about why politicians chose to run or not run in the 
elections in our dataset, it is not possible to identify those cases where defeat of incumbents 
or high rates of turnover are associated with occasions when voters punished politicians 
for inappropriate or unclear policy positions or what were understood to be poor policy 
decisions when the politicians were on council. This valuable information awaits resources 
that would allow researchers to comb archives and newspapers for information on the 
dynamics of individual elections.
18 Joseph Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966). 
19 
Joseph Kushner, David Siegel and Hannah Stanwick, “Ontario Municipal Elections: Voting Trends and Determinants of 
Electoral Success in a Canadian Province,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 30, 3 (1997): 539-553. 
20 Jens Borchert, “Individual Ambition and Institutional Opportunity: A Conceptual Approach to Political Careers in 
Multilevel Systems,” Regional and Federal Studies 21, 2 (2011): 117-140; John R. Hibbing, “Legislative Careers: Why and 
How We Should Study Them,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 24, 2 (1999): 149-171; Schlesinger, Ambition. 
21 
See, for example, Roger B. Myerson, “Local Agency Cost of Political Centralization,” discussion paper (University of 
Chicago, December 2015) http://home.uchicago.edu/~rmyerson/research/localagency.pdf; Doreen Barrie and Roger Gibbins, 
“Parliamentary Careers in the Canadian Federal State,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 22, 1 (1989): 137-145. 
8Analyzing careers in this way allows us to better understand the role of local politicians 
and the character of politics in Edmonton, Calgary and Vancouver. Mapping how clarity 
of choice and concentration of responsibility are expressed through these careers and how 
these two factors interact provides a new window into the realities of responsiveness and 
accountability in Canadian politics
DATA
We begin with a survey of the long-term landscape: the overall development of municipal 
careers, council stability and career trajectories of municipal politicians in each of our 
three case cities over the whole course of their history. This consists of data on the careers 
of each of the 910 men and women who have been elected to city council in Calgary, 
Edmonton and Vancouver since each city’s incorporation.
The data were compiled using archival sources from each city, to which we then added 
information on provincial and federal careers using the Canadian Elections Database — 
containing riding-level election results for every provincial and federal election in Canadian 
history — developed by Anthony Sayers at the University of Calgary.22 To our knowledge, 
these data represent the first large-scale comparative dataset of Canadian municipal 
political careers ever compiled in Canada, and they provide a useful starting point for our 
thinking about the nature of responsiveness and accountability at the municipal level. 
Career Duration 
We begin with career duration: the length of each mayor or councillor’s municipal career in 
Calgary, Edmonton and Vancouver. Figure Two summarizes overall career lengths in each 
city from the late 19th century to the present, capturing the average career length of the 
men and women who sat on council each year. Since many of those who have recently been 
elected have their careers truncated at the present, each of the figures record a substantial 
drop in the most recent period; this portion of the figure is best ignored. 
22 Sayers, Canadian Elections Database. 
9FIGURE TWO AVERAGE CAREER LENGTHS IN EDMONTON, CALGARY AND VANCOUVER, 1885–2016
 
The overall story in each of the three cities is quite clearly one of gradually increasing 
career lengths. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, average career lengths were below 
five years; this increased to about 10 years by the middle of the 20th century, and today 
average municipal careers are in the 10- to 15-year range in each of the three cities.
Figure Three provides a disaggregated look at each of the 910 careers in the dataset, with 
Calgary politicians in blue, Edmonton in red, and Vancouver in green. Each circle in the 
figure represents an individual politician; the horizontal axis captures the year that the 
politician’s career began, and the vertical axis captures the politician’s total career length. 
FIGURE THREE  INDIVIDUAL MUNICIPAL CAREERS IN CALGARY, EDMONTON AND VANCOUVER, BY CAREER 
LENGTH AND YEAR OF ENTRY (CALGARY IN BLUE, EDMONTON IN RED, VANCOUVER IN GREEN)
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Figure Three allows us to understand three basic realities about municipal careers in our 
cities. First, the density of circles in the bottom-left area of the figure reveals that political 
careers of a very short duration were common before the 1930s and remained quite common 
until the 1960s. After the 1960s, the bottom of the figure begins to “empty out,” as very 
short careers became much less common. Second, the top end of the distribution has also 
increased over time; careers in the 20-year range appear early in the 20th century, and 
careers approaching (and then surpassing) 30-year lengths begin to appear in the middle of 
the 20th century. Third, we can see no obvious patterning in the figure by colour, suggesting 
that all three cities have had roughly the same distribution of career lengths over time. 
Incumbency
Given that career lengths have increased in Calgary and Edmonton over time, we might 
assume that incumbent candidates have had more success at re-election in recent years 
than in the past. But this relationship is not strictly necessary: it may be, for instance, that 
candidates in the pre-war years retired more frequently than in recent years rather than 
being more frequently defeated at the polls. We therefore need to examine incumbency 
rates separately from the question of career lengths and council turnover. 
Measuring incumbency rates requires that we have access not only to lists of city 
councillors and mayors over time, but also to municipal election results. Unfortunately, 
we have full election results only for the city of Edmonton. Our analysis in this section is 
therefore based on a separate dataset in which we recorded the number of incumbents who 
ran for office, and the proportion of those incumbents who were re-elected, for each of the 
91 municipal elections in Edmonton’s history. 
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Figure Four reports average incumbency rates for Edmonton municipal elections in each 
decade from 1890 to 2010. While the decade-by-decade numbers are quite variable, the 
general trend in the figure is clear, increasing from the 60- to 70-per-cent range in the early 
period to the 80-per-cent range in the postwar period. What is most remarkable about the 
figure, however, is the most recent period. Since 2001 nearly every incumbent in Edmonton 
11
who has chosen to run for office again in the subsequent election has been re-elected. 
While these individuals only represent about two-thirds of available municipal positions 
in the past two decades, it is still very important to recognize the enormous advantage of 
incumbents in contemporary municipal elections.
Council Stability 
We now turn to council turnover and stability; that is, the proportion of “new faces” on 
council in any given year. Figure Five provides a year-by-year overview of each city; the 
grey lines in each figure represent the actual year-by-year stability rate (the proportion of 
councillors at year t+1 who were also on council at time t). In this way, it captures not only 
the balance of new and returning politicians, but is sensitive to the frequency of elections, 
or term length.
FIGURE FIVE YEAR-BY-YEAR COUNCIL STABILITY IN CALGARY, EDMONTON AND VANCOUVER
 
Two features of council stability are obvious in the figure. First is its gradual increase over 
time: in each of the three cities, year-over-year stability began in the 40-per-cent range in 
the late 19th century, and has risen into the 80- to 90-per-cent range in recent years. Second 
is the obvious and unsurprising impact of increased term lengths on stability rates: the 
increased stability rates clearly reflect the move, first to two-year council terms, in which 
half of council was up for re-election each year, and then more recently to term lengths for 
all mayors and councillors of two, three, and ultimately four years. 
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FIGURE SIX ELECTION-BY-ELECTION STABILITY RATES IN CALGARY, EDMONTON AND VANCOUVER
 
Because of the powerful impact of term lengths on the year-by-year figures, it is also 
useful to look at election-by-election stability rates in each city. These stability rates are 
pictured in Figure Six. In Calgary and Edmonton, the figures appear to be roughly similar: 
somewhat lower stability in the very early years, very high stability in the middle of the 
20th century (driven in large part by the fact that municipal elections in both cities were 
uncompetitive, and in some cases simply uncontested, during the Second World War), and 
then stability rates in the 60- to 70-per-cent range during the postwar era. 
Vancouver’s election-by-election stability rates appear to tell a somewhat different story: 
one of gradual increase up to the middle of the 20th century, followed by an overall 
decline in stability rates since the end of the Second World War. This difference may be 
due to the persistence of municipal political parties in Vancouver elections during the 
same period (the 1960s to 1980s) when such parties were fading into obscurity in Calgary 
and Edmonton. This partisan persistence in Vancouver may be the result of institutional 
differences — Calgary and Edmonton abandoned at-large voting in 1961 and 1971, while 
the at-large system persists in Vancouver up to the present — or it may reflect deeper 
differences in political competition in the two cities. These possibilities are well worth 
future investigation. 
Career Trajectory
Do municipal politicians also serve at the provincial or federal level in Canada? To 
answer this question, we have searched the Canadian Elections Database for each of the 
910 municipal politicians in the dataset. Table Two provides an overview of our findings. 
Overall, levels of provincial participation appear to be somewhat higher in Alberta 
cities (just over 10 per cent in both cases) than in Vancouver, where only five per cent of 
Vancouver politicians have also been elected provincially. At the federal level, the numbers 
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are low in all three cities: just 22 of the 910 municipal politicians in Calgary, Edmonton and 
Vancouver have also been elected to the federal Parliament.23 
TABLE TWO THE PROVINCIAL AND FEDERAL CAREERS OF CIVIC POLITICIANS
Provincial Federal
Calgary 36 / 340 (11%) 6 / 340 (2%)
Edmonton 31 / 264 (12%) 11 / 264 (4%)
Vancouver 16 / 306 (5%) 5 / 306 (2%)
Total 83 / 910 (9%) 22 / 910 (2%)
Our data also allow us to summarize the order in which politicians move through the 
different offices. Table Three below provides a summary of all careers in the dataset 
involving one or two career stages; interestingly, this represents more than 98 per cent 
of all the careers in the dataset, demonstrating that multi-stage political careers (such as 
municipal-provincial-federal), common in the United States, are very rare in Canada. As 
mentioned above, the overwhelming majority of politicians in each city have municipal-
only careers. Of those who do have provincial or federal experience, however, the most 
common career trajectory is to move from the municipal to the provincial level. Of 
those municipal politicians who also have provincial or federal political experience, 
the overwhelming majority begin their careers in municipal politics before entering the 
provincial or federal arenas. 
TABLE THREE THE CAREER TRAJECTORIES OF CIVIC POLITICIANS
Stage 1 Stage 2 Calgary Edmonton Vancouver Overall
Municipal 88% 85% 93% 89%
Municipal Provincial 8% 9% 3% 7%
Municipal Federal 1% 3% 1% 2%
Provincial Municipal 0.6% 2% 1% 1%
Federal Municipal 0.3% 1% 0.3% 0.4%
DISCUSSION
Using the data to map municipal politicians onto our four-way typology of clarity of 
responsiveness and concentration of responsibility allows us to consider the character of 
representative politics in Calgary, Edmonton and Vancouver. The general impression is 
of growing overall predictability in the character of representation in the three cities. The 
current average career length of 10 to 15 years is essentially three times what it was in the 
late 19th century. We can be sure that this reflects high rates of incumbency in Edmonton, 
for which we have data, but without detailed electoral data from the other cities, we are 
unable to say for sure if this is true for these cases. Even in Edmonton, it is not easy to say 
much more without detailed knowledge of why individual incumbents won or lost. A scan 
of reports on recent elections suggests Calgary currently experiences very high levels of 
incumbency, while rates in Vancouver are somewhat lower but still in the 80-per-cent range.
23 Because our focus is on political careers, we focus on those who have been elected at the provincial and/or federal levels, 
rather than those who have run for office at those levels and lost. We manually searched the Canadian Elections Database 
for first and last names. In some cases names were similar but not identical, or candidates were in the database from other 
cities, requiring us to undertake additional biographical research to confirm that the person was indeed a match. 
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Stability is a cruder measure than incumbency, as it treats politicians who choose to 
retire rather than contest and possibly lose an election in the same way as those who are 
defeated. Yet even stability is remarkably high. In recent times in Calgary and Edmonton, 
around 80 to 90 per cent of councillors can be found back on council following an election, 
double the proportion for the earliest period. The pattern is less clear for Vancouver, but 
it too experiences much more stability than in earlier elections, with 60 to 80 per cent of 
councillors regularly returning to council. 
The Vancouver experience of somewhat lower levels of stability than either Calgary or 
Edmonton alerts us to the possibility that the presence of political parties, absent in the 
other cities in recent years, might play a role in shaping the predictability of election 
outcomes in the West Coast city. This greater role for parties in Vancouver may result 
from the continued use of a single, citywide electoral district, which strengthens the 
gains to candidates from co-ordinated campaigns. Calgary and Edmonton also had 
organized parties in periods when elections were in a single, at-large electoral district.24 
A single electoral district might lower the informational load on voters in both selecting 
(responsiveness) and rewarding or punishing (accountability) politicians for their policy 
positions and decisions, the mirror effect of the advantages to politicians of sharing the cost 
of campaigning by forming parties in these types of contests. 
The observed most common career paths, from municipal to provincial and to a lesser 
degree federal politics, are consistent with the theorized relationship: politicians use both 
the experience and exposure of municipal politics to build the skills and name recognition 
for success at elections with broader electorates. Associated with this is greater voter 
awareness of both the political positions (responsiveness) and performance (accountability) 
of these politicians. The numbers are small, suggesting that municipal politics is not seen 
as a required training ground for future provincial or federal politicians, with Alberta 
politicians much more likely to find this career path appealing than their British Columbian 
counterparts. However, the system as a whole benefits from the theorized advantages in 
terms of responsiveness and accountability that come with this type of political career. 
Local Careers and Responsiveness and Accountability Regimes
Our four ideal types of responsiveness and accountability regimes are helpful as a heuristic 
to guide our analysis of representation at municipal elections in Calgary, Edmonton and 
Vancouver. They sensitize us to what might be the causes of the identified stability. Either 
voters are very happy with their municipal politicians or they are lack some information 
that might lead them to vote against incumbents. Unfortunately, we do not have sufficient 
data on civic elections over time with which to assess this claim, such as the major issues, 
positions of councillors, and importance of the previous decisions of council. As such, our 
comments are of a general nature. 
Given the lack of turnover, it is unlikely that our three cases currently experience Type 
4 elections.25 We know relevant information is in general more difficult to come by than 
24 
Jack Masson and Edward C. LeSage Jr., Alberta’s Local Governments: Politics and Democracy (Edmonton, Alta.: 
University of Alberta Press, 1994). 
25 
A reminder: in terms of clarity and responsibility respectively, Type 4 is low-low, Type 3 is low-high, Type 2 is high-low 
and Type 1 is high-high.
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at provincial or federal elections. Yet the fact that many candidates have repeatedly run 
for and won office should provide voters with information on the policy position of those 
seeking re-election. One would think this might also allow challengers the possibility 
of running against the well-known position of an incumbent, clarifying choice, but this 
is dependent on sufficient coverage and interest. Voters should also be able to assign 
responsibility for past decisions to any of the long-serving members of council, although 
they may not be able to distinguish among them. On this basis, recent elections in Calgary, 
Edmonton and Vancouver are not low-clarity, low-responsibility affairs.
Type 3 dynamics do not seem to capture recent elections in our case studies. Stability 
of choice suggests that voters are likely to have some idea of where councillors stand on 
major issues. The degree to which the high threshold for responsibility implied by this 
election type is met depends on how we judge accountability. If we accept that voters apply 
their view of council equally to all incumbents, the threshold may well be met. All that is 
required is a general sense of whether council has behaved appropriately. We cannot say 
whether voters make use of individual voting records, a much higher bar, in choosing a 
candidate. Given evidence from elsewhere that when there is turnover councillors tend to 
be swept away as a group,26 the first scenario seems more likely and might be considered as 
meeting the requirement of Type 3 elections.
Type 2 has some appeal as a description of elections in our three cities. Clarity of position 
should be high given that most politicians have been in office for some time. But this 
model is not descriptive if we take responsibility to be of the collective sort noted above. 
Collective responsibility would exceed the low threshold required by this model. Requiring 
evidence of the use of individual voting records would be a tougher test, although as the bar 
is set low, even this might be met.
It seems that Type 1 is descriptive of clarity of choice in our case studies if we accept that 
stability provides sufficient information for voters to understand the policy positions of 
incumbents. We cannot know without further study whether coverage of civic elections 
reaches this threshold, or if voters are paying attention. If we accept that voters might 
assign their general sense of council votes — that is, whether they are in the broad 
policy direction they favour or not — to all incumbents equally, then concentration of 
responsibility would operate. If the question is, rather, can they assign responsibility at an 
individual level on the basis of votes on council, it is unclear whether this threshold is met.
In general, to the degree that stability allows voters to identify the policy positions of 
incumbent councillors and assign responsibility for past actions, this should favour greater 
clarity of responsiveness (the vertical scale) and concentration of responsibility when applied 
to incumbents as a group (the horizontal scale). The career trajectories for those who move 
beyond municipal politics would have a similar effect. Without detailed attitudinal and 
knowledge surveys of municipal voters, it is very difficult to be more precise.
26 
Andrew Sancton, “What happened to incumbent councilors in Greater Sudbury and London, Ontario in 2014? The Role of 
the Ontario Ombudsman’s Reports on Secret Meetings,” unpublished manuscript. 
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Careers, Incumbency and Democracy
Our city-election case studies present an interesting challenge for democratic theory. 
Responsiveness and accountability, understood as clarity of choice and concentration of 
responsibility, are likely to improve with longer careers, greater incumbency and stability, 
and the movement of individual councillors to other levels of government. The longer a 
politician is around, the more likely it is that voters are aware of her or his policy positions 
and decisions. This finding is perhaps most surprising with respect to accountability. 
Stability is the antithesis of our general sense that the defeat of incumbents who have failed 
in some way is the gold standard for retrospective or economic voting.
Despite the sense that re-election or defeat are tests of responsiveness or accountability 
voting, this is open to interpretation. Re-election does not necessarily mean acceptance of 
policy promises or reward, but may reflect inertia or perhaps limited support shaped by 
the availability of information, the alternatives confronting voters, and the differing roles 
of representatives.27 Even defeat, which might be more easily read as rejection of policy or 
as punishment, could be capturing a range of other personal or partisan considerations and 
changes in the choice of candidates offered to voters. The character of both responsiveness 
and accountability are inextricably linked to contingent factors and institutional logics and 
incentives that vary by time and place.28
It may be that our models of responsiveness and accountability need serious renovation. 
There is growing evidence that voters do not seem much engaged in politics nor well 
informed. Rather than careful assessment of long-term government performance, recent 
events heavily influence their vote. Group rather than individual identities may play a key 
role in shaping perceptions of politics and preferences. It also seems that voters are inclined 
to align their preferences with those of the parties, candidates, and leaders they prefer rather 
than their own self-interest.29 By this account, voting is not about signalling individual 
policy preferences and assessing government actions so much as choosing an appealing 
candidate based on short-term, group-based preferences. The peculiar dynamics of civic 
politics provide us with an opportunity to reconsider the character of responsiveness and 
accountability and the role of political parties shown in Figure One.
The Struggle for Parties in Civic Politics
Political party formation is a response by politicians to the intractable co-ordination issues 
that plague mass politics. They are co-ordination mechanisms for solving the collective-
action challenges of organizing and articulating interests and solving social-choice 
problems associated with legislating policy outcomes. Parties operate within a political and 
institutional context that defines incentives that in turn shape the behaviour of politicians in 
their search to gain and hold office. They fill a gap, offering solutions to problems that 
27 
Heinz Eulau and Paul D. Karp, “The Puzzle of Representation: Specifying Components of Responsiveness,” Legislative 
Studies Quarterly 2, 3 (1977): 233-254. 
28 
John Ferejohn, “Accountability and Authority”; Scott Ashworth, “Electoral Accountability: Recent Theoretical and 
Empirical Work,” Annual Review of Political Science 15 (2012): 183-201. 
29 
Christopher Achen and Larry M. Bartels, Democracy for Realists: Why Elections do not Produce Responsive Government 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2016). 
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current institutional arrangements do not solve directly and that politicians have come to 
believe cannot be solved in any other way.30 
Political parties do not exist in two of our three cases, and in the one case where they 
do exist they may offer only limited assistance in helping voters clarify their choices 
or understand who is responsible for previous government decisions. Compared to 
provincial or federal elections, the parties’ policy platforms are not strongly developed, 
their campaigns are not high-spending nor high-contact affairs, and the cohesiveness of 
those running under party banners is highly variable.31 There is evidence that electoral 
systems help shape these differences. Single citywide electorates may favour the formation 
of parties, perhaps because they help candidates solve a severe electoral co-ordination 
problem, lowering the cost of campaigning. Their legislative role may be vestigial. 
Civic politicians appear to have identified alternative means for solving the collective-
action and social-choice problems associated with elections and governing. If there are 
no unsolved problems that the additional co-ordination offered by parties might address, 
there is no need for them. There may be other barriers to their success, but we would need 
more information than is currently available, perhaps from interviews with politicians, to 
say much about these. Our study helps us to think about how municipal politicians might 
balance the advantages that come with the electoral and legislative co-ordination offered by 
parties against the compromises they entail.
Sharing the costs of elections, particularly where a ward system is in use, may be of 
little consequence in what are generally low-competition and modest-spending affairs. 
Incumbent councillors should have the wherewithal to run competent candidate-centred 
campaigns. The aggregating and articulation of interests that come from electoral co-
ordination may have limited appeal. As independent agents, they may more easily avoid 
policy positions that hurt their chances of re-election. Absent a first mover, there may be not 
much advantage to party formation. Policy flexibility may favour electoral success.
The lack of parties may also be helpful in allowing civic politicians to blur distinctions 
between themselves, their council colleagues, or electoral opponents. They remain free 
to build an individual policy profile — emphasizing issues that favour them — or blur 
distinctions between them and other members of council or electoral challengers. From 
this perspective, political parties deliver only the costs of co-ordination to politicians. Any 
additional clarity of choice and/or concentration of responsibility that parties deliver is best 
avoided if, together with the other costs parties impose, councillors see them as reducing 
their chances of re-election. 
Agenda control is central to the power of executives in most parliamentary systems and 
underpins the development of disciplined parties.32 Mayors in our three cities do not 
dominate the legislative agenda and are unable to enforce voting outcomes.33 They do 
30 John Aldrich, Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1995). 
31 
Paul Tennant, “Vancouver Civic Politics, 1929-1980,” BC Studies 46 (1980): 3-27; C. Richard Tindal et al., Local 
Government in Canada (Toronto: Nelson Education, 2017). 
32 Cox, The Efficient.
33 
Richard D. McKelvey, “Intransitivities in Multidimensional voting Models and Some Implications for Agenda Control,” 
Journal of Economic Theory 12 (1976): 472-482. 
18
not possess the power to create rules and administrative procedures to reward or punish 
councillors for how they vote. If little is to be gained from dominating the office, a major 
impulse for legislative co-ordination is absent, as are its indirect co-ordinating effects. 
Lack of agenda control may be another reason why councillors might not wish to oversell 
their voting records. Not only is no one in control, but voters may well misunderstand the 
limited power of the mayor, assigning too much responsibility for council decisions to 
the office and perhaps to those councillors who voters believe are aligned with the mayor. 
Party membership looks unappealing from this perspective as well. The freedom to shape 
an image of their policy performance with little media oversight is likely a net win for 
councillors. General claims about “wanting what is good for the city” may go uncontested. 
It is not trivial that by advertising events in parliament, the English media played a key role 
in strengthening the role of parties and concentrating the power of the executive in 19th-
century Britain.34 The disaggregated nature of Canadian parties and federal and provincial 
party systems may also reduce external pressure for electoral or policy co-ordination.35
With little to hold legislative coalitions together, it is more likely that they will form and 
dissolve by issue. Once patterned, this behaviour may satisfy politicians. Incumbents 
might wish to limit evidence of patterned policy agreement or disagreement as a collective 
response to electoral challengers. This is particularly true for ward-based elections, as 
incumbent councillors do not normally compete against each other. If city councillors 
inhabit what they think of as an optimum position with respect to their chances of re-
election, any change threatens greater uncertainty. They may well prefer a low-information 
environment with limited competition, no parties and great electoral stability. 
For voters, seeing little change at elections, noting that this has generated few crises, and 
knowing relatively little about councillors (or, put differently, facing a heavy burden to 
understand their policy positions), they may be inclined to either re-endorse politicians who 
have avoided scandal, or perhaps not vote at all. Voters are likely to choose councillors 
based on experience. That can only be to the advantage of incumbents, the exception being 
those rare cases where the whole of council falls into disrepute. 
Instead of hoping to hold civic politicians accountable for their policy positions or actions, 
voters may be choosing to vote for what they perceive to be a trustworthy, “good type” 
of politician who has experience on a council that has had few scandals. This is a useful 
shortcut or algorithm for voters operating in a low-information environment who do not 
wish to expend the effort required to make a more nuanced decision.36 This reinforcing 
set of ideas is consistent with much of what we know about civic elections, and may help 
explain why much of the infrastructure normally associated with responsiveness and 
accountability seen in Figure One is missing. Exploring these questions is beyond the scope 
of this study, but clearly deserving of future attention. 
34 Cox, The Efficient, 53-60. 
35 
David Stewart, Anthony M. Sayers and R. Kenneth Carty, “Partisan Competition in the Canadian Prairies,” in Provinces: 





The responsiveness of politicians to voters and the accountability of officeholders for past 
decisions are central to representative politics. In the absence of information (such as voter 
surveys tied to our cases) exploring whether voters can identify the positions of individual 
councillors and align them with their own, we must be cautious. Similarly, without knowing 
why some politicians lose, it is not clear whether success or failure depends upon voters 
holding them to account by rewarding or punishing them for their policy decisions.
We use patterns of career length, incumbency, council stability and career trajectory of 
politicians in Calgary, Edmonton and Vancouver to begin exploring how responsiveness 
and accountability, understood as clarity of choice and concentration of responsibility, 
operate at civic elections. We find that the signalling mechanisms associated with each do 
not operate in the same way as they do in other forms of elected politics. Stability, rather 
than competition, provides the major route for information to flow to voters about the policy 
positions and prior decisions of civic politicians.
The politics of these councils is very different from that of parliamentary governments 
and their election contests. Many of the mechanisms associated with responsiveness and 
accountability on display in Figure One are missing or of limited strength in our three 
cities. Political parties are weak or non-existent, while executive control of the legislative 
agenda is limited. Given increasing skepticism as to the role political parties play in 
signalling individual voter preferences at election, these cases offer an opportunity to 
rethink our concepts of modern democratic representation.
We know that civic elections are low-information environments and that this may 
complicate the task of clarifying policy responsiveness and accountability among those 
seeking office. Our data show that civic politicians do not suffer the regular defeat that 
might suggest they are being held responsible for their policy choices while in office. This 
is slightly less true in Vancouver, where we have noted that the presence of political parties 
may play a role in allowing for this sort of signalling. But it is also true that high levels of 
stability do not in themselves indicate a failure of these mechanisms. 
To the degree that stability lowers the informational requirement on voters with respect to 
knowing the policy position of councillors and how they have voted on council, it may well 
improve clarity of choice and concentration of responsibility. It may also be that stability, 
low information, and low voter turnout are self-reinforcing. With little knowledge of 
councillors or their actions, a presumption that little will change, and evidence that this has 
in general led to acceptable political outcomes, voters may well feel little is to be gained 
from removing incumbents or even voting in the first place. 
We suggest as an initial hypothesis that the incentive structures facing councillors in ward-
based elections do not favour party formation, and that this may reveal that it is in the 
interests of civic politicians to sustain a low-information environment. This is captured 
in Figure Seven. Routes 2 and 3 describe the process voters follow to vote for a policy 
preference or hold politicians accountable for past decisions. By encouraging voters to travel 
route 1, civic politicians reduce information collection by voters and encourage competition 
on non-policy matters such as personal characteristic, including experience on council.
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FIGURE SEVEN INCENTIVES TO ACQUIRE INFORMATION AT CIVIC ELECTIONS














Hellwig, Timothy. 2011. ‘Context, Political Information, and Performance Voting,’ in Russell J. Dalton and Christopher 
Anderson (Eds.), Citizens, Context, and Choice: How Context Shapes Citizens’ Electoral Choices, New York NY.: Oxford 
University Press.
In this stable, low-information environment, councillors may be willing to satisfice in terms 
of policy outcomes as a means of avoiding the higher transaction costs associated with 
competitive elections.37 Under these conditions, councils are likely to act as corporate bodies 
rather than expressing the predictable divisions associated with more partisan legislatures.
In other words, when given a choice between the uncertainty and extra demands of 
an information-rich, highly competitive electoral and legislative domain and that of a 
potentially more controllable low-information, modestly competitive environment, civic 
politicians favour the second. They limit policy differences and seek out the support of 
repeat voters who cast their vote based on experience on council. Exploring this question is 
beyond our present study, but one we think worthy of attention.
Those wishing to engage our city councils in policy discussion should be aware of these 
unusual dynamics. Stability and unity suggest that long-term strategies of persuasion and 
an emphasis on common purpose — seeking consensus — may well be more effective than 
short-run attempts to dominate or divide council. Internal coalitions, where they do exist, 
are likely to be too unstable to provide a basis for long-term strategic behaviour.
As well, the lack of an executive with clear agenda control is both a challenge and an 
opportunity. While it complicates the task of shaping legislative outcomes, it may limit the 
capacity of council to fully exclude issues raised by external pressure. Together with the 
consensual nature of decision-making, this may contribute to policy inertia, suggesting that 
successes may be difficult to overturn.
Finally, councillors may see attempts to divide them or unseat their compatriots at election 
time as reducing their own chances of re-election, and therefore as personal attacks and a 
threat to their collective existence. At the same time, the rare open elections that result from 
retirements offer opportunities for reshaping — if only somewhat — the policy composition 
of council through engagement in the electoral process. 
37 James G. March and Herbert Simon, Organizations, (New York: Free Press, 1958); Ronald Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” 
Economica, 4 (1937): 386-405.
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